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FY-end 2019 ERS Oil Crops Outlook report, September 30, 2019 <ref>https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=94927 ERS Oil Crops Outlook report released in September 2019.</ref>
FY-end 2019 ERS Oil Crops Outlook report, September 30, 2019 <ref>https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=94927 ERS Oil Crops Outlook report released in September 2019.</ref>
[[File:USDA-ERS_US_soybean_exports_2016-2019.png]]
[[File:USDA-ERS_US_soybean_exports_2016-2019.png]]



Revision as of 15:29, 23 January 2026

🔗 Sources, Documentation Just some links to supporting docs re: sub posts or things that might come up on stream.

⭐️

  1. Federal Reserve: Policy Issues in the 119th Congress, 01/14/2026
  2. FY2025 Immigration Court Data: Case Outcomes, 01/12/2026
  3. Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, 12/19/2025
  4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 Public law 94-583 10/21/1976

Iran Sanctions Timeline

POTUS & Executive Actions

WIP ⚠️

  • the EO's by Admin: Clinton, Bush 43, Obama, 🍊
    • Inserting the Iran elections shift w/ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 2005?-2013, when he restarted/lifted ban on uranium enrichment
  • UN Actions, including the UNSC
  • JCPOA, Obama envoy Kerry and the Iran sanctum sanctions law, followed by the 3 Obama EO's
    • 🍊 2017 actions, iirc around the time we pulled out of the JCPOA.
  • Framework includes OFAC and the financial regs in the CFR


Debunking the 🍊 claim that Obama gave Iran ‘150 Billion in Cash’

- link the Pinocchios. It was their own money (frozen assets)

Obama-era

Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010 Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses by the Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions

Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011 Authorizing the Implementation of Certain Sanctions Set Forth in the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended

Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011 Authorizing the Imposition of Certain Sanctions with Respect to the Provision of Goods, Services, Technology, or Support for Iran's Energy and Petrochemical Sectors

Obama archives: Rollout materials, for Iran Nuclear Deal


Treasury's Sanctions Programs

Sanctions at Treasury

  • SDN list, Specially Designated Nationals List (in PDF format) - list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries.
    • also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific.
    • Their assets are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. Read more information on Treasury's Sanctions Programs.

Consolidated, the non-SDN list

Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations

[1] === see. the CFR

  • Facilitating the efforts of the Government of Iran (GOI) to acquire or develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or delivery systems for WMD or to provide support for terrorist organizations or acts of international terrorism;
  • Facilitating the activities of a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, or 1929, or any other Security Council resolution that imposes sanctions with respect to Iran;
  • Engaging in money laundering, or facilitating efforts by the Central Bank of Iran or any other Iranian financial institution, to carry out either of the facilitating activities described above; or
  • Facilitating a significant transaction or transactions or providing significant financial services for: (i) the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its agents or affiliates whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), or (ii) a financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to IEEPA in connection with Iran’s proliferation of WMD, Iran’s proliferation of delivery systems for WMD, or Iran’s support for international terrorism.

Judiciary 🧑‍⚖️

Legal Opinions: New or Topical

January 20th: Supreme Court denies review in several gun cases

The Supreme Court on Tuesday [2] morning turned down several petitions for review challenging the ban on the possession of guns by people who have previously been convicted of felonies. However, the justices did not act on a similar case brought by a woman convicted of passing a fake check nearly two decades ago. The announcement came as part of a list of orders released from the justices’ Jan. 16 conference. After adding four new cases to its docket for the 2025-26 term, the court did not grant any additional cases on Tuesday.

The court denied review in four cases brought by men who have been convicted of felonies – Zherka v. Bondi, Duarte v. United States, Collins v. Bondi, and Pierre v. United States. The justices did not act, however, on a petition for review filed by Melynda Vincent, a single mother who was convicted of check fraud and sentenced to probation 17 years ago for passing a fake check for $498.12 at a grocery store. Vincent was sentenced to probation. Now a licensed clinical social worker, Vincent is challenging the constitutionality of the federal felon-in-possession law as it applies to her. The Supreme Court has now considered Vincent’s case at five consecutive conferences.

Separately, and despite the Trump administration’s recommendation that it should take up the case, the Supreme Court declined to decide a question related to the interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a 1976 law that generally shields foreign governments from lawsuits in U.S. courts. The issue came to the court in Agudas Chasidei Chabad v. Russian Federation, a long-running dispute seeking to recover a religious library and archive seized by the Soviet Union and held in Russia. [...]

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the Russian government had immunity under the FSIA. In its view, the exception applied to foreign governments only if they bring the property at the center of the case to the United States; it does not apply if the foreign governments give the property to a government agency or organization that does business in the U.S.

...In December, at the court’s invitation, the Trump administration filed a “friend of the court” brief in which it urged the court to grant review. However, perhaps because two justices – Brett Kavanaugh and Ketanji Brown Jackson – recused themselves from the proceeding, the court denied review. Jackson indicated that she would not participate in the case because of “prior judicial service” – that is, participation in the case during an earlier stage while she was a judge on the D.C. Circuit. Although he did not explain his recusal, that is presumably why Kavanaugh also did not participate.

Jackson dissented from the court’s decision to reject a request from Danny Howell, an Indiana inmate serving a 70-year sentence, to file a petition for review “in forma pauperis” – that is, without paying the $300 filing fee and the more substantial costs of printing a Supreme Court brief. The court’s order provided that because Howell “has repeatedly abused this Court’s process,” he would not be able to file new petitions “in noncriminal matters” (such as habeas relief, which is civil) without paying the filing fees.

Jackson explained that “[e]ven if Howell were to identify meritorious grounds for habeas relief or wanted to bring a justifiable challenge to his conditions of confinement, he will now be prevented from doing so unless he pays the filing fee—no matter what.” Such a “categorical, forward-looking filing bar” is “intolerable as to incarcerated individuals,” Jackson wrote.

For the same reasons, Jackson noted similar dissents in three other cases: Allen v. Guzman, Sullivan v. United States, and Diehl v. United States.

The justices will meet again for another private conference on Friday, Jan. 23.

Posted in Court News, Featured, Merits Cases Cases: Vincent v. Bondi, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, Zherka v. Bondi, Duarte v. United States

Primer on Trump v. Cook

Oral Arguments 1/21/2026 [3]

The Supreme Court will hear oral argument on Wednesday in yet another battle over the president’s power to remove the heads of independent agencies created by Congress. Wednesday’s arguments center on President Donald Trump’s attempt to fire Lisa Cook, a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, in August 2025. The lower courts have thwarted his efforts to do so thus far, but the Trump administration has asked the Supreme Court to put those rulings on hold while Cook’s challenge to her firing continues. Here’s a brief explainer on the case, Trump v. Cook, and its background.

What is the Federal Reserve?

The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. Its responsibilities include conducting U.S. monetary policy – that is, taking steps to achieve big-picture economic objectives, such as “price stability, full employment, and stable economic growth.”

The Fed is also an independent government agency. Unlike most agencies, it is funded primarily through interest earned on securities that it owns, rather than through the normal congressional appropriations process.

The Fed’s main governing body is its seven-member board of governors.

Who is Lisa Cook?

Cook is a 62-year-old economist with bachelor’s degrees from Spelman College and Oxford (where she was a Marshall Scholar) and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. In 2022, Cook was confirmed as a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors – the first Black woman to hold that position. In 2023, then-President Joe Biden nominated Cook to serve a new 14-year term on the board.

What are the laws governing the tenure and removal of members of the Fed’s Board of Governors?

Under the Federal Reserve Act, members of the Fed’s Board of Governors are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate for staggered 14-year terms – a structure intended to prevent any single president from “stacking the deck” with his own nominees. They can only be removed by the president, and only “for cause,” a term that the law does not define.

What grounds did Trump cite in firing Cook?

Trump cited allegations that Cook had committed mortgage fraud before joining the Fed – specifically, that within the space of two weeks she had designated both a house in Michigan and a condo in Atlanta as her “primary residence” when taking out loans, which would have allowed her to receive more favorable terms. And that alleged fraud, Trump said, “[a]t a minimum … exhibits the sort of gross negligence in financial transactions that calls into question [her] competence and trustworthiness as a financial regulator.”

In Cook’s filings in the Supreme Court, she “unequivocally” denies the accusations of mortgage fraud, and she says that she is “prepared to refute the allegations in an appropriate forum.” In September, NBC News reported that Cook described her Atlanta condo on financial forms as a “vacation home,” which would undermine the mortgage fraud allegations.

What happened in the lower courts?

Judge Jia Cobb of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an order in September that required the Fed to allow Cook to remain in her job while her challenge to her firing moves forward. In Cobb’s view, Cook was “substantially likely” to succeed on her claim that the Trump administration had “violated the Federal Reserve Act because her purported removal did not comply with the statute’s ‘for cause’ requirement.” The Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal provision, Cobb wrote, is best interpreted to mean that members of the board of governors can only be removed for things that they do while they are in office “and whether they have been faithfully and effectively executing their statutory duties.”

Cobb also ruled that Cook’s firing likely violated her rights under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, because she had a property interest in her position as a member of the board of governors and therefore was entitled to be notified and have a chance to contest her firing before she was removed from it.

Although the Trump administration had contended that Cobb could not review the president’s determination that he had “cause” to fire Cook, Cobb rejected that argument. If a court is “confronted with a justification offered by the President that does not clearly fall within the President’s statutory authority,” she wrote, courts have a “responsibility to review” that determination. Otherwise, she said, the “for cause” removal provision “would provide no practical insulation for the members of the Board of Governors.”

Cobb declined to put her ruling on hold while the government appealed. The Trump administration went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which – by a vote of 2 to 1 – also left Cobb’s ruling in place.

What happened next?

The Trump administration went to the Supreme Court on Sept. 18, asking the justices to pause Cobb’s ruling and allow it to fire Cook. U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer told the court that Cobb’s order keeping Cook in office was “yet another case of improper judicial interference with the President’s removal authority.”

Cook urged the justices to leave Cobb’s order in place. She argued that allowing the Trump administration to remove her from office now would “dramatically alter the status quo, ignore centuries of history, and transform the Federal Reserve into a body subservient to the President’s will.”

On Oct. 1, the justices put off ruling on the Trump administration’s request to freeze Cobb’s order. Instead, they announced that they would hear oral arguments on the administration’s application in January.

What is the issue before the Supreme Court on Wednesday?

As a technical matter, the question before the court is whether it should pause Cobb’s ruling (allowing the president to fire Cook) or instead leave it in place (allowing Cook to remain in her job) while litigation continues. But as a practical matter, a significant factor in a court’s inquiry into whether to grant temporary relief is the merits of the underlying dispute – that is, whether the president’s attempted firing of Cook was proper.

What has the Supreme Court said and done about Trump’s efforts to remove the heads of other multi-member independent agencies?

In proceedings last year on its interim docket, the court allowed Trump to fire other independent agency heads, including members of the National Labor Relations Board, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission, despite federal laws protecting them against removal without good cause.

In December, the justices heard oral arguments in the case of Rebecca Slaughter, a member of the Federal Trade Commission whom Trump fired in March. Although the court has not yet issued its decision, a majority of the justices appeared to agree that the law governing the removal of FTC commissioners – which bars the president from firing them except in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” – violates the constitutional separation of powers between the three branches of government.

What has the Supreme Court said about the Federal Reserve Board, and what was its rationale?

In its order allowing the Trump administration to remove members of the NLRB and the MSPB, the majority responded to the officials’ argument that permitting their firings to stand would call into question the structure of other independent multi-member agencies, including the Federal Reserve. The majority described the Federal Reserve as “a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”

What are the arguments that the Trump administration is making?

The Trump administration emphasizes that the issues before the court are narrow – and do not involve either the Fed’s independence or the constitutionality of the “for cause” removal protections for the board of governors.

Instead, the Trump administration argues, there are three questions in the case. The first is whether under either the Constitution or federal law Cook is entitled to formal notice and a hearing before she can be fired. The answer, the government says, is no. Cook does not have a constitutional right, the Trump administration says, because the Supreme Court has ruled that a public office is not the kind of “property” that can provide a right to due process before it is taken away. And if Congress had intended Cook to have a statutory right to a notice and a hearing, the Trump administration adds, it could have said so explicitly – which it has done in other laws.

The second question in the case, according to the Trump administration, is whether the mortgage fraud allegations were a sufficiently good reason for him to fire Cook. As an initial matter, the government says, if the president provides a cause for firing an official like Cook, courts cannot “second-guess his judgment that the removal is justified.” But in any event, the Trump administration continues, the president did have good cause to fire Cook in this case. When the removal restriction was enacted, the Trump administration contends, the phrase “for cause” “required a reason ‘relating to the conduct, ability, fitness, or competence of the officer.’” Trump’s firing of Cook meets that standard, the government writes.

The Trump administration also contends that the court should put Cobb’s ruling on hold because she does not have the power to reinstate Cook – or at the very least does not have the authority to do so temporarily. Among other things, the Trump administration suggests, “[t]he President’s power to remove an executive officer includes the power to suspend the officer until the removal’s lawfulness is resolved.” The Trump administration also notes that a different federal law, the Civil Service Reform Act, “provides a comprehensive scheme of remedies” – including the possibility of reinstatement and back pay – “for federal officers and employees but deliberately excludes Senate-confirmed officers” like Cook “from relief.” That exclusion, the Trump administration posits, indicates that Congress did not want to “allow removed Governors to seek relief, whether reinstatement or back pay.”

What arguments does Cook make?

Cook first insists that courts can review the president’s attempt to fire her. A contrary rule, she argues, “would eviscerate Congress’s choice to safeguard the Board’s independence and protect Board governors from arbitrary removals.” Otherwise, she contends, the president could get around the removal requirement simply by labeling any removal – regardless of the reason or lack thereof – “for cause.”

When courts look at the president’s decision to fire her, Cook continues, it is clear that the basis for his firing was not legally sufficient. The Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal requirement, she says, was intended to incorporate the existing grounds for the removal of other executive officials – inefficiency, neglect, malfeasance in office, or ineligibility. Congress certainly did not “intend[] the Federal Reserve’s governors to enjoy less protection” from removal “than leaders of other multimember agencies,” she stresses.

Cook also pushes back against the Trump administration’s contention that she was not entitled to notice and a hearing before she could be fired. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, she notes, it was established that officials appointed under laws that established a definite term for their service and protected them against removal except “for cause” had a right to notice and a hearing. Moreover, she continues, in the court’s landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall made clear that “Marbury’s for-cause tenure meant he had a ‘vested legal right’ in his office.”

Cook insists that history and the law support her right to remain in office until her legal challenge to Trump’s effort to fire her is finally resolved. Quoting a “friend of the court” brief filed in the case, she emphasizes that “‘from 1789 to today, courts have consistently held that executive officers threatened with or subject to unlawful removal may properly be retained in office.’”

Is Cook still at the Federal Reserve?

Yes. Cook remains on the job and participated in key policy-making decisions in September, October, and December. At the September meeting, the Fed lowered interest rates for the first time since December 2024; it cut rates again at its October and December meetings.

Cook cites her continued work at the Fed as yet another reason to keep Cobb’s order in place while the litigation continues. There has been no suggestion, she says, “that the economy or the markets have reacted poorly to Governor Cook’s continued participation in Federal Reserve policymaking activities. That the status quo has been maintained for months without any apparent problem only confirms that the public interest favors allowing Governor Cook to retain her office while this suit proceeds.”

Is this related to the criminal investigation of Jerome Powell, the chair of the Fed?

Yes and no. Even before his attempt to fire Cook, Trump had long been dissatisfied with the Fed’s reluctance to lower interest rates, and with Jerome Powell in particular. Trump had publicly mused about the prospect of firing Powell, whose term as chair (although not as a member of the board of governors) expires in May.

The criminal investigation that the Department of Justice launched against the Fed and Powell is being conducted by Jeanine Pirro, the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, alleging irregularities in the $2.5 billion renovation of the Fed’s headquarters and Powell’s statements to Congress about that renovation. The White House has said that Trump did not direct Pirro to investigate Powell.

Who will be arguing at the court on Wednesday?

Sauer will represent the Trump administration. Paul Clement, who served as the solicitor general during the George W. Bush administration, will represent Cook.

How long will the argument take?

The court has allocated one hour – 30 minutes per side – for Wednesday’s argument. However, the argument is likely to last significantly longer than that.

When will the court issue its decision?

There is no way to know exactly when the court will issue its decision. However, the court almost always issues all of its rulings by late June or early July.

Posted in Court News, Merits Cases Cases: Trump v. Wilcox, Trump v. Slaughter (Independent Agencies), Trump v. Boyle, Trump v. Cook (Independent Agencies), Trump v. Cook



Case No. 25-cv-03899 (APM) CITY OF SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA v. Wright, DOE Secretary. Filed 01/12/26. Opinion & Order, against 🍊 cancellation of grants violated 5th Amendment.

OMB Director, Russell Vought, bragged that nearly “$8 billion in Green NewScam funding to fuel the Left’s climate agenda is being cancelled,” then listed only states that did not vote for Trump. Meanwhile on Truth Social, Trump confirmed he met with Vought to “determine which of the many Democrat Agencies, most of which are a political SCAM, he recommends to be cut” during the shutdown.

On Monday, US District Judge Amit Mehta wrote in his opinion that the case was “unique” because ordinarily “the mere presence of political considerations in an agency action” does not mean that officials have run “afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.”

But in this case, Trump “freely” admitted that he made grant termination decisions “primarily—if not exclusively—based on whether the awardee resided in a state whose citizens voted for President Trump in 2024.” And that classification had “no rational relationship” to the government’s supposed interest in cutting off funding, Mehta found, which was that projects were not “economically viable” or didn’t advance the administration’s energy goals. In fact, Mehta noted that similar projects in red states continued to receive funding.

Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Why "Abolishing ICE" is a bad idea.

If ICE were eliminated...

  • No federal agency has the combined customs law and immigration law authority to go after cartels, human trafficking rings, and cyber criminals across borders.
  • Economic protection: unchecked, counterfeit, imports, fraud, and illicit finance would cost US businesses billions annually. In FY23, seized $10.4 million in counterfeit goods and $25.86 million in general merchandise.
  • International cooperation: disruption of joint investigations, weakened partnerships; the fact that we have 16 partner nations shows ICE diplomatic leverage in fighting crime globally.
  • There is no centralized body to enforce human detention practices leading to greater legal exposure in human rights criticism.
  • Workforce expertise: just like with DOGE and some of my related criticisms (e.g. where Elon went after workforce with a sledgehammer not a scalpel), 20,000 of the highly trained, good ice agents would be gone with the wind; Losing institutional memory and specialized skill sets, primarily because of its unique mandate, which includes immigration, customs enforcement, and specified investigative techniques. (It's hard to replace from elsewhere.)
  • The majority of ICE discretionary core enforcement resources are in HSI (Homeland security investigations) – recall Tiny poking fun at the jackets of the DHS agents in MN after the Shirley/Somali investigations… they were HSI.
  • Only ~15% (of discretionary core enforcement spend) are for Enforcement and removal operations (ERO).

ICE Quick Reference

What does ICE do besides the current activities under 🍊 47?

FIVE CORE PROGRAMMATIC FUNCTIONS

1. Enforcement and removal operations (ERO) - detain and remove non-citizens who pose a threat (e.g. terrorists, gang members, war criminals). Note: of the approximately 1.2 million removals in 2023, 600,000 were voluntary fill the legal obligations under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

2. HSI - human trafficking, child, exploitation, cyber crime, financial crime, narcotics, counterfeit goods, weapons, illicit opioids supply chain

3. Customs and trade enforcement - import/export compliance, seizing contraband, protecting intellectual property; forfeiture proceeds, go back into law enforcement

4. Detention standards and oversight - akin to internal affairs. Sets national detention standards, inspect facilities, handles misconduct complaints.

5. International partnerships - joint task forces, extends the US reach in law-enforcement/investigations, shares intelligence, and builds the US capacity abroad; as of FY 23, 16 partner countries.

Authority to Arrest, Prosecute

While ERO primarily conducts administrative arrests for violations of US immigration law it also has the authority to make criminal arrests and initiate prosecution cases for immigration-related offenses, primarily under Title 8, but also under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Using this authority, ERO Criminal Prosecution teams work with AUSA offices to pursue violations of the U.S. Criminal Code that come to light during enforcement actions. Noncitizens who are convicted generally complete their criminal sentences. The noncitizens are subsequently taken into ICE custody for administrative immigration violations and placed into removal proceedings after completing their criminal sentences.

Statutory Authority

Pub. L. 119–1, §1, Jan. 29, 2025, 139 Stat. 3 The Laken Riley Act. 8 USC 1101 note.

Immigration and Nationality Act, as codified, U.S. Code – Title 8 (Aliens and Nationality)

  • Gives ICE four distinct enforcement mandates (removal, criminal investigations, customs enforcement, and immigration adjudication).
  • Non‑Immigration Powers – Sections § 1152 (employment visas) and § 1159 (refugee admissions) empower ICE to protect the labor market and national security beyond “cracking down on undocumented folks.”
  • Congressional Intent – The act was crafted to balance openness (visa categories) with protection (inadmissibility grounds) so stripping ICE would upset that equilibrium and force Congress to rewrite huge swaths of law.
Cites

ICE Annual Reports – general overview of the agency’s mission, ERO priorities, and OPR oversight

  1. FY 2023 press release that breaks out the HSI statistics (arrests, narcotics seizures, counterfeit goods, child‑exploitation victims, etc.)
  2. “2023 Year‑in‑Review” feature – details on the Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) expansion to 16 partner countries and other FY 2023 highlights
  3. PDF of the FY 2023 Annual Report (full tables, seizure totals, arrest counts, etc.)
  4. PDF of the FY 2024 Annual Report (latest seizure numbers, operational updates, and emerging priorities)

🍊 Tariffs

Soybeans and Oil Crops,[4] China & Tariffs

U.S. Farmers Fear the Worst as China Slaps Tariffs on Soybeans. US News & World Report. By Andrew Soergel. April 4, 2018, at 1:11 p.m.

Family Farms Pushed to Get Big or Go Bust. A consolidated agricultural landscape has complicated the lives of some small- and mid-sized farmers. By Andrew Soergel. US News & World Report. April 4, 2018, at 12:01 a.m.

FY-end 2019 ERS Oil Crops Outlook report, September 30, 2019 [5]

Summary of U.S. Executive Tariff Actions (Jan 20–Dec 31, 2025)[6]

Table 1. Summary of U.S. Executive Tariff Actions
Description Affected Nation Current Tariff Rate / Status
Actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, Table 2)
Fentanyl-related Canada 35% on most goods; 10% on potash and Canadian energy; United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemption.
Fentanyl & Migration Mexico 25% on most goods; 10% on potash; USMCA exemption.
Fentanyl-related China 10% on all goods; ended de minimis duty-free treatment.
Example Example Example
Venezuelan Oil Designated 25% on all goods from countries designated by the Sec. of State.
Trade Deficit/ Reciprocal Global 10%-41%, by country of origin, on most goods (with exceptions); Paused: 125% on China.
Ending De Minimis Treatment Global Ended de minimis duty-free treatment.
Brazil's Government Policies Brazil 40% on select goods (with exceptions).
Importing Russian Oil India 25% on most goods (with exceptions).
Actions under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, Table 3 and Table 4)
Steel Global 50% globally; 25% on imports from the United Kingdom (UK).
Aluminum Global 50% globally; 25% on imports from the UK.
Automobiles & Parts Global 25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU;* some USMCA exceptions.
Copper Global 50% globally on semi-finished copper products.
Timber/Lumber Global 10%-25% globally; 10% for UK;* 15% for Japan, South Korea, and EU.*
Trucks and Buses Global 10% on buses globally; 25% on trucks and truck parts globally; some USMCA exceptions.
Semiconductors TBD Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Pharmaceuticals TBD Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Critical Minerals TBD Investigation initiated (April 2025).
Aircraft TBD Investigation initiated (May 2025).
Drones TBD Investigation initiated (July 2025).
Polysilicon TBD Investigation initiated (July 2025).
Wind Turbines TBD Investigation initiated (August 2025).
Robotics TBD Investigation initiated (September 2025).
Medical Equipment TBD Investigation initiated (September 2025).
Actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, Table 5)
China's Semiconductor Policies China Investigation completed. China's policies found actionable. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) proposed no additional tariffs in 2026, and a potential rate increase in June 2027.
China's Shipping Industries China Investigation completed. Action of port fees and tariffs suspended.
Nicaragua's Labor Rights Nicaragua Investigation completed. USTR proposes tariffs beginning in 2027.
Brazil's Trade Practices Brazil Investigation initiated (July 2025).
China's Phase One Agreement Compliance China Investigation initiated (October 2025).
Foreign Digital Services Taxes TBD President directed USTR to consider renewing past investigation.
International Seafood TBD President directed USTR to consider a new investigation.

Source: CRS, compiled from official U.S. government documents. See report and tables for additional details. Notes: TBD = to be determined. EU = European Union. Many 2025 tariff actions, with exceptions, are cumulative. Details may change due to bilateral trade deals not yet implemented or other policy changes. *For UK, EU, South Korea, and Japan, auto and timber rates include most-favored nation tariffs. UK auto rates include tariff-rate quota for vehicles.

Current as of --SontaranStratagems (talk) 09:02, 15 January 2026 (UTC)

On the Hill 🏛️

Committee Reports, EC's 📌

01/07/2026 — EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS; Congressional Record Vol. 172, No. 4. SENATE EC's 2417[7], and 2415.[8] A communication from the Acting Deputy Division Chief, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Security Bars and Processing; Confirmation of Effective Date; Partial Withdrawal" ((RIN1615-AC57)(RIN1125-AB08)) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on January 5, 2026; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

  • A communication from the Acting Deputy Division Chief, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking to File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions" (RIN1615-AD01) received in the Office of the President of the Senate on January 5, 2026; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  • H. Rept. 119-198 — 119th Congress (2025-2026) — Accompanies: H.R.1327 H.R.1327 - Syria Terrorism Threat Assessment Act This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to provide Congress with an assessment of terrorist threats to the United States posed by individuals in Syria affiliated with either a foreign terrorist organization or a specially designated global terrorist organization.



[Note, Devon authorized my requested use of this wiki page. Blesstiny. :D]